Migual Carranza and Amelia Sanchez v. United States : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2009
Migual Carranza and Amelia Sanchez v. United
States : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brett L. Tolman; Jeffrey E. Nelson; Amy J. Oliver; Attorneys for Defendants.
Brett R. Boulton; Flickinger & Sutterfield; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Carranza and Sanchez v. United States, No. 20090409.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2931
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
MIGUEL CARRANZA and AMELIA 
SANCHEZ, natural parents of Jesus M. V. 
Carranza-Sanchez, deceased, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
UNITED STATES, et al., 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20090409-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
CERTIFICATION OF QUESTION OF STATE LAW TO UTAH SUPREME COURT BY 
THE UNITED STATES DIS f RICT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH-CENTRAL DIVISION 
JUDGE DALE A. KIMBALL 
Brett L. Tolman, United States Attorney 
Jeffrey E. Nelson, Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Amy J. Oliver, Assistant U.S. Attorney 
185 South State Street #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Brett R. Boulton 
FLICK1NGER & SUTTERFIELD, P.C. 
3000 N. University Ave., Suite 300 
Provo,Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
MIGUEL CARRANZA and AMELIA 
SANCHEZ, natural parents of Jesus M. V. 
Carranza-Sanchez, deceased, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
UNITED STATES, et al, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20090409-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
CERTIFICATION OF QUESTION OF STATE LAW TO UTAH SUPREME COURT BY 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH-CENTRAL DIVISION 
JUDGE DALE A. KIMBALL 
Brett L. Tolman, United States Attorney 
Jeffrey E. Nelson, Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Amy J. Oliver, Assistant U.S. Attorney 
185 South State Street #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Brett R. Boulton 
FLICKINGER & SUTTERFIELD, P.C. 
3000 N. University Ave., Suite 300 
Provo,Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
PARTIES AND COUNSEL 
APPELLANT: 
MIGUEL CARRANZA and AMELIA 
SANCHEZ, natural parents of Jesus M. V. 
Carranza-Sanchez, deceased 
APPELLEES: 
UNITED STATES, et al. 
Counsel for Appellants: 
Brett R. Boulton 
FLICKINGER & SUTTERFIELD, P.C. 
3000 N. University Ave., #300 
Provo,UT 84604 
(801)370-0505 
(801) 343-0954-Fax 
Counsel for Appellee: 
Brett L. Tolman, United States Attorney 
Jeffrey E. Nelson, Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Amy J. Oliver, Assistant U.S. Attorney 
185 South State Street #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-5682 
(801) 524-4473- Fax 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
QUESTION OF LAW CERTIFIED TO UTAH SUPREME COURT 1 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 10 
A. The legislature's use of the term "minor child" in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-11-6 is ambiguous and therefore the Court may properly 
consider relevant policy considerations in determining the intent 
of the legislature 10 
B. The Utah legislature has explicitly demonstrated its commitment to 
protect the unborn 11 
C. The legislature is committed to holding individuals responsible for 
haiming the unborn 13 
D. Finding that Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 allows a claim for the 
wrongful death of an unborn child would not violate the principle of 
state decisis 14 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 19 
ADDENDUM 20 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-627(3)(a)(I) 2, 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-303(6) 3,12 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201(1) 3,13 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-301.1(2) and (3) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 4, 10 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-102 4 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(l) 1 
CASES 
Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975) 14-16 
R&R Industrial Park, L.L.C. v. The Utah Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Assoc. 
199 P.3d 917, 923 (Utah 2008) 11 
Spackman v. Board of Educ. Of the Box Elder County Sch. Dist., 2000 UT 87 1 
State Farm v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183 (1996) 17, 18 
Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114 (Utah 1942) 14, 18 
ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(1). 
QUESTION OF LAW CERTIFIED TO UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Does Utah's wrongful death statute allow an action for the wrongful death of an 
unborn child? 
Standard of Review: On certification from federal district court, the Utah Supreme 
Court's duty is to answer the legal question presented. The Court will not seek to resolve 
the underlying dispute. Spackman v. Board of Educ. Of the Box Elder County Sch. Dist.. 
2000 UT 87. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
§ 31A-22-627. Coverage of emergency medical services 
(1) A health insurance policy or health maintenance organization contract 
may not: 
(a) require any form of preauthorization for treatment of an 
emergency medical condition until after the insured's condition has 
been stabilized; or 
(b) deny a claim for any covered evaluation, covered diagnostic test, 
or other covered treatment considered medically necessary to 
stabilize the emergency medical condition of an insured. 
(2) A health insurance policy or health maintenance organization contract 
may require authorization for the continued treatment of an emergency 
medical condition after the insured's condition has been stabilized. If such 
authorization is required, an insurer who does not accept or reject a request 
for authorization may not deny a claim for any evaluation, diagnostic 
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testing, or other treatment considered medically necessary that occurred 
between the time the request was received and the time the insurer rejected 
the request for authorization. 
(3) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "emergency medical condition" means a medical condition 
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity, including 
severe pain, such that a prudent layperson, who possesses an average 
knowledge of medicine and health, would reasonably expect the 
absence of immediate medical attention at a hospital emergency 
department to result in: 
(I) placing the insured's health, or with respect to a pregnant 
woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child, in 
serious jeopardy; 
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions; or 
(hi) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; and 
(b) "hospital emergency department" means that area of a hospital in 
which emergency services are provided on a 24-hour-a-day basis. 
(4) Nothing in this section may be construed as: 
(a) altering the level or type of benefits that are provided under the 
terms of a contract or policy; or 
(b) restricting a policy or contract from providing enhanced benefits 
for certain emergency medical conditions that are identified in the 
policy or contract. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-627(3)(a)(I) 
§ 76-5-201. Criminal homicide — Elements — Designations of offenses 
(a) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise 
specified in the statute defining the offense, causes the death of another 
human being, including an unborn child at any stage of its development. 
(b) There shall be no cause of action for criminal homicide for the death of 
an unborn child caused by an abortion. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201(1) 
§ 76-7-301.1. Preamble — Findings and policies of Legislature 
(1) It is the finding and policy of the legislature, reflecting and reasserting 
the provisions of Article I, Sections 1 and 7, Utah Constitution, which 
recognize that life founded on inherent and inalienable rights is entitled to 
protection of law and due process; and that unborn children have inherent 
and inalienable rights that are entitled to protection by the state of Utah 
pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-7-301.1 
§ 75-7-303. Representation by fiduciaries and parents 
To the extent there is no conflict of interest between the representative and 
the person represented or among those being represented with respect to a 
particular question or dispute: 
(1) a conservator may represent and bind the protected person whose estate 
the conservator controls; 
(2) a guardian may represent and bind the ward if a conservator of the 
ward's estate has not been appointed; 
(3) an agent having authority to act with respect to the particular question or 
dispute may represent and bind the principal; 
(4) a trustee may represent and bind the beneficiaries of the trust; 
(5) a personal representative of a decedent's estate may represent and bind 
persons interested in the estate; and 
(6) a parent may represent and bind the parent's minor or unborn child if a 
conservator or guardian for the child has not been appointed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-303(6) 
§ 78-11-6. Injury or death of child -- Suit by parent or guardian 
Except as provided in Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act, a 
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parent or guardian may maintain an action for the death or injury of a minor 
child when the injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another. Any civil action may be maintained against the person causing the 
injury or death or, if the person is employed by another person who is 
responsible for that person's conduct, also against the employer. If a 
parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, or legal guardian is the alleged 
defendant in an action for the death or injury of a child, a guardian ad litem 
may be appointed for the injured child or a child other than the deceased 
child according to the procedures outlined in Section 78-7-9. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-102 (Previously Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs allege that as a result of medical negligence committed in the State of 
Utah, their full term baby boy was stillborn. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), the law 
and place of the negligence applies to all substantive issues in case. Therefore, the law of 
Utah applies. 
Plaintiffs argue that their child died because he was post mature, meaning the baby 
was alive up to and beyond the time that he reached full term. Plaintiffs allege that 
Defendant breached the applicable standards of care setting forth reasonable precautions 
and measures required by the facts of this case. 
Plaintiffs evoked Utah's wrongful death statute as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 
78-11-6 in bringing their claim. Plaintiffs requested non-economic damages for the 
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wrongful death of their child. 
Defendant filed its Motion in Limine and requested that "any evidence concerning 
damages for the wrongful death of their unborn cliild is inadmissible at trial because none 
of these damages are cognizable Utah law.'5 Defendant's Motion in Limine (Doc. 21), 
Carranza v. United States, Case No. 2:07cv00291, United States District Court, District of 
Utah at 1-2. Defendant further argued in its supporting memorandum that "an unborn 
fetus is not a 'minor child' under Utah law and Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages for 
the wrongful death of their unborn child." Defendant's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion in Limine (Doc. 22 at 3). 
Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Certify Question of Law to the Supreme Court. 
(Doc. 26). This motion was granted by Judge Dale A. Kimball in his Memorandum 
Decision and Order Certifying Question to Utah Supreme Court. (Doc. 31). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On or about April 14, 2006, Plaintiff Sanchez, nine months pregnant, had 
an appointment with Dr. George Delaney at the Mountainlands Community Health Center 
("MCHC"), located in Provo, Utah. (Doc. 2 at 3). 
2. Plaintiff Sanchez had experienced various complications and was subjected 
to various risks during this pregnancy that concerned her and that should have elicited a 
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higher standard of care from her treating physicians at MCHC. Id. 
3. Treatment notes indicate that the treating physicians at MCHC were aware 
that Sanchez had suffered from preeclampsia during her first two pregnancies and they 
suspected that she may have had preeclampsia in this pregnancy. Plaintiff was 39 years 
old at the time of this pregnancy and as such, her pregnancy was considered a high risk 
pregnancy which elicits a higher standard of care and caution. Id. 
4. Additionally, an ultrasound performed by Dr. Donna S. Dizon-Townson, 
MD, on February 28, 2006, revealed that the baby may have had an ailment referred to as 
"double bubble" in the abdomen which raised concerns of a possibility of duodenal 
atresia and the potential for Down's Syndrome. In her report, Dr. Dizon-Townson stated 
that during prolonged observation of the fetus on ultrasound, she felt the "double bubble" 
had resolved and the stomach appeared to be within normal limits but that it was possible 
that the baby may have had pyloric stenosis or a partial obstruction with intermittent 
resolution. Id- at 3-4. 
5. Additionally Dr. Dizon-Townson counseled Plaintiff Sanchez that the child 
was at an increased risk for genetic aneuploidy based on her advanced maternal age, 
abnormal serum marker screen, and an abnormal ultrasound. Id. at 4. 
6. Plaintiff Sanchez was concerned about the baby's heart rate and expressed 
6 
these concerns to Dr. Delaney at the time of her April 14, 2006 visit. A few weeks before 
her April 14, 2006 visit with Dr. Delaney, Plaintiff Sanchez had an appointment with 
Monica Sanchez, APRN, of MCHC, where Monica Sanchez, APRN, told Plaintiff that 
her baby's heartbeat sounded a little weak. Plaintiff Sanchez and her husband, Plaintiff 
Carranza, asked Monica Sanchez, APRN, why the heartbeat sounded weak. Ms. Sanchez 
told them that it was due to the positioning of the baby in the womb. On Plaintiffs April 
14,2006 visit, Dr. Delaney told Plaintiff that the heart rate remained low, but was normal 
at this phase of the pregnancy and that Plaintiff Sanchez had nothing to be concerned 
about. Id. 
7. At this April 14, 2006 appointment with Defendant Delaney, Plaintiff 
Sanchez expressed concerned about the fact that she had already lost her mucus plug and 
that she was experiencing erratic, heavy vaginal bleeding and erratic, strong contractions. 
M. 
8. At the time of the appointment, Plaintiff Sanchez told Dr. Delaney that, 
based on her experience with the delivery of her first two children and her need to be 
induced with those deliveries, she felt the loss of her mucus plug, the bleeding, the 
irregular contractions, the presence of a reduced heart rate, and the fact that she was only 
one day short of being forty weeks pregnant, were all signs that it was time for her to be 
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induced. Id. at 4-5. 
9. Plaintiff Sanchez requested that she be induced immediately. Id. at 5. 
10. Despite the numerous indicators that Plaintiff Sanchez should be admitted 
to the hospital for induction, including the loss of her mucus plug, the erratic and 
heavy bleeding, the erratic and strong contractions, the fact that she was forty weeks 
pregnant, the fact that she was thirty-nine years old, her concern over her baby's weak 
heartbeat, as well as her experience in her first two pregnancies where she had to be 
induced, Dr. Delaney negligently told Plaintiff Sanchez that if it were actually time for 
her to have the baby that she would hurt much more than she did at that time and that her 
contractions would be more regular. Id. 
11. Sanchez again informed Dr. Delaney that her contractions are never regular 
at the time of her deliveries and that she was in fact quite uncomfortable at this time. Id. 
12. Dr. Delaney assured Sanchez that her baby was very strong and that she 
should not worry. Dr. Delaney negligently ignored Sanchez's request to be induced and 
the other above described indicators that she and her unborn child were in distress and 
instead sent Plaintiff Sanchez home without perforating a stress test or satisfying 
Sanchez's concerns. Id. 
14. Dr. Delaney negligently set another appointment for Sanchez ten day later, 
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which would have been a week and half past her due date. Id. at 5-6. 
15. On April 19,2006, Sanchez continued to feel strong erratic contractions. 
Plaintiff Sanchez checked into Utah Valley Regional Medical Center located in Provo, 
Utah. She arrived on April 19, 2006 at 10:30 a.m., at which time she received an 
ultrasound; no heartbeats where found and the baby was diagnosed as deceased. Id. at 6. 
16. Dr. Vernon White of MCHC was Sanchez's attending physician and 
advised that the baby be delivered normally, without the aid of a medical induction. Id. 
17. When Sanchez was unable to give birth for many hours and after suffering 
the physical and emotional pain associated with a prolonged delivery and the knowledge 
that her child was already dead, Plaintiff Sanchez prevailed upon Defendants to medically 
induce the labor. Id. 
18. The child did not show signs of Down's Syndrome or other defects and was 
otherwise healthy and viable. Id. 
19. Plaintiffs filed suit on May 3, 2007. 
20. Following some discovery Defendant's filed their Motion and 
Memorandum in Limine to Exclude from Trial all Evidence Regarding Plaintiffs' 
damages for Wrongful Death on April 2, 2009. Doc. 21. 
21. On May 14, 2009, Judge Dale A. Kimball of the Utah District Court issued 
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his Memorandum Decision and Order Certifying Question to Utah Supreme Court. (Doc. 
31.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based on the Utah legislature's explicit and implicit commitment to protecting 
unborn children, Utah's wrongful death statute can most reasonably be interpreted to 
allow for a cause of action for the wrongful death of an unborn child. 
ARGUMENT 
The dispute between the parties in this case focuses on the meaning of the term 
"minor child" in Utah's wrongful death statute codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6. 
The statute does not define the term "minor child" and there is no provision excluding an 
unborn child from the definition of "minor child." The statute is therefore ambiguous. 
While the statute is ambiguous, the legislature's intent to protect the unborn is clear. 
Given the Utah legislature's stated commitment to protecting unborn children, the term 
"minor child" should be interpreted to encompass a unborn child. 
A. The legislature's use of the term "minor child59 in Utah Code Ann. § 78-
11-6 is ambiguous and therefore the Court may properly consider 
relevant policy considerations in determining the intent of the 
legislature. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "a statute is ambiguous 'if the terms used . . 
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. may be understood to have two or more plausible meanings."' R&R Industrial Park, 
L.L.C. v. The Utah Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Assoc. 199 P.3d 917, 923 
(Utah 2008) (internal citations omitted). Once a statute is deemed to be ambiguous the 
court may then "use extrinsic interpretive tools such as policy and legislative intent to 
guide [its] analysis." Id. 
Here, the term "minor child" is ambiguous because it can plausibly be understood 
to include unborn children, especially because the term is not defined by the legislature 
and where there is no provision excluding an unborn child from the definition of "minor 
child." 
B. The Utah legislature has explicitly demonstrated its commitment to 
protect the unborn. 
The Utah legislature has explicitly and clearly demonstrated its commitment to 
protecting unborn children. In the preamble to the criminal code's abortion provisions, 
the legislature states that "the state of Utah has a compelling interest in the protection of 
the lives of unborn children," and "[i]t is the intent of the legislature to protect and 
guarantee to unborn children their inherent and inalienable right to life as required by 
Aiticle I, Sections 1 and 7, Utah Constitution." Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-301.1(2) and (3). 
Defendant argues that if the legislature had intended for plaintiffs to be able to 
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recover damages for the wrongful death of unborn children then it would have used the 
words "unborn child" in the wrongful death statute. See Defendant's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion in Limine (Doc. 22) at 4-5. Defendant then cites to other parts of the 
code where the legislature has used the term "unborn child" to show that when the 
legislature wants to protect unborn children it uses the precise words to do so. .Id. 
For example, under Utah's probate code, "a parent may represent and bind the 
parent's unborn child if a conservator or guardian for the child has not been appointed." 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-303(6). Likewise, under Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-
627(3)(a)(I), an emergency medical condition" is defined as "placing the insured's health 
or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child, in 
serious jeopardy." 
Plaintiff interprets these statutes as further evidence of the legislature's 
commitment to protect the unborn. These measures each seek to protect the rights of the 
unborn child. In the probate code, unborn children are enabled to be represented in a 
probate proceeding, while Utah Code Annotated § 31 A-22-627(3)(a)(I) provides 
assistance to unborn children with respect to access to emergency medical care. 
The legislature is expansive and liberal in granting protections and rights to the 
unborn rather than being restrictive. Therefore a narrow interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 78-11-6 which would lessen protection of the unborn would be incompatible with the 
legislature's stated commitment to policies protecting the unborn. 
C. The legislature is committed to holding individuals responsible for 
harming the unborn. 
Under Utah's criminal code, a person commits "criminal homicide if he 
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental 
state otherwise specified in the statute, causes the death of another human being, 
including an unborn child at any stage of its development." Utah Code Ann. §76-5-
201(1). 
If the legislature intended to hold individuals criminally responsible for the death 
of an unborn child, then it would logically and morally follow that the legislature also 
intends to hold individuals civilly responsible when their negligent actions cause the 
death of an unborn child. 
While the legislature has at times used the term "unborn child" to add clarity with 
respect to who is affected by certain laws, it does not logically or morally follow that 
failure do so necessarily means unborn children are not to be protected. This is 
particularly true when the legislature has affirmatively stated a duty to protect the unborn. 
While the legislature has a duty to be clear in its usage of words it is not uncommon for 
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many people, including legislators to consider of fully developed or viable unborn babies 
as children or persons. 
D. Finding that Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 allows a claim for the wrongful 
death of an unborn child would not violate the principle of state decisis. 
Although there is no Utah case that has decided whether a wrongful death claim 
may be made for the death of an unborn child under § 78-11-6 since it was amended in 
2003 to include the phrase "minor child", there are older cases which have addressed the 
subject generally. Plaintiffs assert that a review of these cases shows that the Court is 
clearly not bound by these prior decisions and seems to be moving towards the national 
majority position which allows such claims to be made. 
The first Utah case to address this issue is Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114 (Utah 
1942). In Webb, the plaintiff brought an action for assault and battery that resulted in a 
miscarriage. The Utah Supreme Court held that: 
While injuries resulting in a miscarriage are actionable, and compensation may be 
awarded for the physical and metal sufferings by a woman who has a miscarriage 
by reason of injuries caused by the wrongful acts of others, damages are not 
awarded for "loss of the unborn child" itself. 
Id. at 119 (Utah 1942). 
Thirty-three years after Webb, the Utah Supreme Court decided Nelson v. 
Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975). In Nelson, the Court upheld the holding in Webb 
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that the plaintiff was not entitled to seek damages for the wrongful death of her unborn 
child. Id. at 1077. 
However, the Court in Nelson then allowed the plaintiff to introduce evidence of 
the mother's "mental suffering experienced by a woman undergoing such an experience." 
Id. Similarly, the court in Nelson allowed the defendant to introduce evidence that the 
deceased child was illegitimate and that the plaintiff was a welfare recipient even though 
the trial court had granted plaintiffs pre-trial motion to bar defendant from doing. Id. 
When a defense witness testified that the deceased child was illegitimate and that 
the plaintiff was a welfare recipient the trial court justified its refusal to grant plaintiffs 
request for a mistrial as follows: 
She is here claiming great mental anguish because of the loss of the child. I think 
the fact that it was an illegitimate child might very well have a bearing upon that 
very thing. Id. At 1077. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Nelson concluded that "the jury was entitled to know 
all the circumstances if they were fairly to appraise the quantum of mental anguish which 
[the mother] suffered" including the fact that the mother had seven other children and the 
fact that the child was illegitimate. See Id. 
In summary, the Court in Nelson holds that a wrongful death claim may not be 
made for an unborn child but then allows evidence into trial that is essentially impossible 
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to differentiate from the type of evidence normally presented in wrongful death cases. 
Specifically, the jury in Nelson was allowed to consider evidence that the mother plaintiff 
may have been less entitled for recovery for the loss of her child because she had a lot of 
children already, was unmarried, and poor; meaning, impliedly, that her emotional loss 
would be less that an married affluent woman who had no other children. 
The Court in Nelson held that when trying to fairly appraise the amount of mental 
anguish suffered by a Plaintiff who loses an unborn child, "the jury is entitled to know all 
the circumstances." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1077. 
Again, the decision in Nelson is self-contradictory in that it held that there could 
be no claim for the wrongful death of an unborn child but then the Court allowed 
extensive wrongful death-type evidence to be introduced. 
The Nelson decision was decided by a four to one vote with Justice Maughan 
authoring a compelling dissent: 
. . . we would not do an injustice to stare decisis for the reason that the concept 
advanced by [Webb v. Snow] is no longer a part of the weight of authority in this 
country. Additionally, I see no moral, biological, or legal rationale for sustaining 
an outmoded, dry, rule laced with the fictions of a bygone era. 
Nelson, at 1079. 
Justice Maughan's dissent in 1975 is even more accurate today as at least 36 states 
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recognize the right of heirs to make a wrongful death claim for an unborn child. See 
Wrongful Death and the Legal Status of the Previable Embryo: Why Illinois is on the 
Cutting Edge of Determining a Definitive Standard for Embryonic Legal Rights, 19 
Regent U.L. Rev. 251, footnotes, 40, 41, and 42 and Primer on Legal Recognition & 
Protection of Unborn & Newly Born, Defending Life 2009, available at 
http ://dl.aul.org/ub w/primer-on-legal-recognition- and-protection-of-the-unbom-
and-newly-bom, (copies attached). 
The most recent Utah case discussing a possible wrongful death claim for an 
unborn child is State Farm v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183 (1996). In Clyde, Mr. and Mrs. 
Clyde's minor daughter was killed in an automobile accident. The minor daughter was 
pregnant at the time of the accident and her unborn child also died. The primary issue 
before the Court in Clyde was whether the grandparents had standing to make a wrongful 
death claim for the unborn child. The Court held that under Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6, 
the Clydes, as grandparents, did not have standing to make a wrongful death claim on 
behalf of the unborn child. Id. at 1186. In making this finding the Court noted: 
Because we conclude that the Clydes do not have standing to maintain an action 
for the wrongful death of their unborn grandchild, we need not decide the more 
general question of whether the death of a fetus can ever provide the basis for 
maintaining an action under section 78-11-6. 
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Id at n. 4. 
Based on this language, the Utah Supreme Court in Clyde considers the question 
of whether the death of an unborn child may be the basis of a claim under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-11-6 to be unresolved. Had the Supreme Court taken the position that the 
death of an unborn child could never be the basis for a claim under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
11-6 it could have easily resolved the case before it in that way. 
Similarly, the Court, after determining the Clydes did not have standing, could 
have simply indicated that the death of the unborn grandchild could not have been the 
basis for a claim under Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 and then directly cited to the Webb 
case. However, instead of stating "see Webb v. Snow" the court used the abbreviation 
"Cf." as in uCf. Webb v. Snow" meaning compare to Webb v. Snow which indicates that 
there are differences between the two positions and that there remained a "more general 
question" that did not need to be decided at that time. See Id. 
Due to the Court's decision to not answer the "more general question" of whether 
the death of an unborn child may be the basis for a wrongful death claim in Utah, the 
current Supreme Court is not bound by stare decisis when detennining the intent of the 
legislature. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the above stated reasons, Plaintiffs request that the Court rule that a wrongful 
death claim may be maintained for the death of an unborn child. 
DATED this 31st day of December, 2009. 
FLICKINGER & SUTTERFIELD 
Brett R. Boulton 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Memorandum Decision, Judge Dale A. Kimball, United States District 
Court, District of Utah. 
2. Wrongful Death and the Legal Status of the Previable Embiyo: Why Illinois 
is on the Cutting Edge of Determining a Definitive Standard for Embiyonic Legal Rights, 
19 Regent U.L. Rev. 251. 
3. Primer on Legal Recognition & Protection of Unborn & Newly Born, 
Defending Life 2009. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Memorandum Decision, Judge Dale A. Kimball, 
United States District Court, District of Utah. 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
MIGUEL CARRANZA and AMELIA 
SANCHEZ, natural parents of Jesna M.V. 
Carranza-Sanchez, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES and John and Jane 
Does I-X, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER CERTIFYING QUESTION TO 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Case No 2:07CV291DAK 
Judge Dale A Kimball 
This matter is before the court on two interrelated motions (1) Defendant Umted States 
of Amenca's Motion in Limine to Exclude From Trial All Evidence Regarding Plaintiffs Miguel 
Carranza and Amelia Sanchez's Damages for Wrongful Death, and (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Certify Question of Law to the Utah Supreme Court The court held a hearing on the motions on 
May 12, 2009 At the hearing, Plaintiffs were represented by Brett R Boulton and Defendant 
was represented by Amy J Oliver and Jeffrey E Nelson After careful consideration of the 
parties' memoranda and arguments made at the hearing, as well as the facts and law relevant to 
the present motions, the court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order 
BACKGROUND 
Between December 28, 2005, and April 19, 2006, Plaintiff Amelia Sanchez received 
prenatal care at the Mountainlands Community Health Center in Provo, Utah. Mountainlands 
and its contracted physicians and employees are deemed to be employees of the United States 
government by the Health Resources and Services Administration and Bureau of Primary Health 
Care, in accordance with Section 224(g) of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 233(g) as 
amended by the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-73), for 
purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346. 
On April 19, 2006, Sanchez went to the Labor and Delivery Department at Utah Valley 
Regional Medical Center where it was determined that the fetus exhibited no movement or 
heartbeat. Sanchez's labor was induced, and she gave birth to a stillborn male on April 20, 2006. 
Factually, the parties dispute whether medical negligence occurred in this case. Plaintiffs 
argue that the fetus died because he was post mature, meaning that the baby was alive up to and 
beyond the time that he reached full term. Plaintiffs allege that medical professionals at 
Mountainlands breached the applicable standards of care by not monitoring her condition more 
closely in her final weeks of pregnancy and not inducing labor at her doctor's visit on April 14, 
2006. At that visit, Sanchez had lost her mucous plug and informed her doctor that she was 
experiencing vaginal bleeding and erratic contractions. Her doctor, however, did not induce her. 
The United States' expert witness, Dr. Later, states that "the cause of stillborn was a 
nuchal cord event, which unfortunately is unavoidable." Dr. Later states that the loss of a 
mucous plug and irregular contractions are common several days before delivery and are not an 
indication to proceed with an immediate induction. The expert's report notes that Sanchez called 
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Mountainlands three days after her doctor's visit, on April 17, 2006, complaining of contractions 
and discharge. She was told to go to Labor & Delivery, but she did not go until April 19, 2009. 
Dr. Later opines that even had she gone to the hospital on April 17, findings may have been 
normal and the cord accident may have still occurred later as it did. He states that cord accidents 
are not age-related and cannot be predicted. 
Plaintiffs present action against the United States is brought pursuant to the FTCA. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1346 etseq. The FTCA authorizes actions against the United States for damages 
caused by the negligence of government employees under circumstances where a private person 
would be liable under state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The United States is liable to the same 
extent as a private individual in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission 
occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). 
On October 12, 2006, in accordance with the regulations implementing the FTCA, 
Plaintiffs filed the requisite "Standard Form 95-Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death" with the 
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1). The Standard 
Form 95 is designed for any type of claim that can be asserted under the FTCA. The Standard 
Form 95, therefore, provides boxes or sections for the claimant to state the nature and extent of 
the claim. The boxes describing the claims are then followed by boxes allowing the claimant to 
identify the amount of damages sought in connection with the claim. 
The relevant section provided on the Standard Form 95 for a description of the claim 
relevant in this case was pre-printed "personal injury/wrongful death." Under this section, 
Plaintiffs stated that the nature and extent of the claim was: "Death of Claimaint's unborn son, 
Jesua Miguel Valentin Carranza-Sanchez, as a result of medical malpractice. See Addendum." 
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Plaintiffs attached a four-page Addendum providing a narrative of the nature and extent of their 
claim Plaintiffs' Addendum states "Notice is hereby given by Amelia Sanchez and Miguel 
Carranza of their intent to commence a medical malpractice action against Mountamlands 
Community Health Center" and the healthcare professionals providing Sanchez prenatal care 
who were deemed employees of Mountamlands The Addendum provides a paragraph identified 
as "Nature of Claim " Under this heading, Plaintiffs state "Sanchez and Carranza's claim is 
based upon the negligent care of the above named health care providers and health care facility 
and those who may have assisted them m treating Sanchez and her unborn child " The 
Addendum then gives a factual description of Sanchez's medical conditions, prenatal care, and 
delivery Plaintiffs state that because there was a nuchal cord entanglement, which consisted of 
the cord wrapping one time around the baby's throat, the doctor told Plaintiffs' that an autopsy 
would not be necessary Pathology examined the baby and the placenta and observed no fetal 
anomalies 
Plaintiffs' Addendum concludes with a paragraph entitled "Nature of Injuries and 
Damages " Under this heading, Plaintiffs state that as a result of the medical negligence, 
"Plaintiffs, as parents of the deceased, have suffered the injuries described above, including 
funeral expenses and general damages of pam and suffering, loss of affection, loss of 
companionship, and loss of happiness of association " 
Under the section for "Amount of Claim" on the Standard Form 95, the form provides 
boxes for "property damage," "personal injury," "wrongful death," and a "total amount " In this 
damages section, Plaintiffs identified $1,000,000 of damages in the "wrongful death" box, and 
$1,000,000 in the "total amount" box Plaintiffs did not list any damages under "personal 
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injury." 
After Plaintiffs submitted their Standard Form 95, the claim was deemed denied because 
six months passed without a formal denial by HHS. The denial of their claim allowed Plaintiffs 
to bring their action in this court. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint alleges only one cause of 
action entitled medical negligence. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed "to reasonably and 
adequately provide medical care to Plaintiff Sanchez during her pregnancy." First Am. Compl. % 
26. Although the claim is styled as a medical negligence claim, many of the allegations and 
requested damages refer to a wrongful death claim. Plaintiffs allege that 
[a]s a direct, proximate, and foreseeable consequence and cause of 
the aforementioned negligence, acts, failures to act, refusals to act, 
and breaches of duty on the part of Defendants, Plaintiffs, as the 
surviving natural parents of the deceased, have personally suffered 
and will continue to suffer loss of companionship, loss of 
association, loss of advice, loss of counsel, loss of comfort, lost of 
happiness of association, and other noneconomic and general 
damages for the wrongful death of their child in such amounts as 
the Plaintiffs will establish at the trial hereof. Plaintiffs are entitled 
to recover all economic and noneconomic damages, together with 
such other damages as may be provided under Utah's wrongful 
death statute of § 78-11-7 and other applicable law, from the 
Defendants. 
Id. Tf 28. Plaintiffs prayer for relief seeks damages against Defendants: "a. for general damages 
for Plaintiffs conscious and unconscious pain and suffering from the date of the death of their 
child in a reasonable amount;" "b. for general and noneconomic damages for the wrongful death 
of their child in a reasonable amount;" and "c. for special damages for medical, funeral, and 
burial expenses incurred as a result of injuries to and the wrongful death of their child as 
proven." 
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ANALYSIS 
Defendant's motion in limine asks this court to preclude Plaintiffs from testifying as to 
any alleged damages of loss of companionship, loss of association, loss of advice, loss of 
comfort, loss of happiness of association, and other noneconomic and general damages for the 
wrongful death of their unborn child because none of these damages are cognizable under Utah 
law. Defendant argues that the court should exclude any evidence related to damages associated 
with a wrongful death cause of action because there is no claim of action under Utah law for the 
wrongful death of an unborn child. 
Plaintiffs, however, contend that this court should recognize a cause of action for the 
wrongful death of an unborn child and allow Plaintiffs to testify to the associated damages. 
Plaintiffs brought a Motion to Certify Question of Law to the Utah Supreme Court asking this 
court to certify the question of whether Utah's wrongful death statute allows a wrongful death 
cause of action for an unborn child. Plaintiffs argue that the question presents a controlling issue 
of law in this case and there appears to be no controlling Utah law. Plaintiffs ask this court to 
stay its ruling on Defendant's motion in limine until the Utah Supreme Court has acted on the 
order of certification. 
Rule 41(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "the Utah Supreme 
Court may answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the United States when 
requested to do so by such certifying court. . . if the state of the law of Utah applicable to a 
proceeding before the certifying court is uncertain." Utah R. App. P. 41(a). The certification 
order must state the "question of law to be answered," "that the question certified is a controlling 
issue of law in a proceeding pending before the certifying court," and "that there appears to be no 
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controlling Utah law." Id. 41(c). Courts have found that certification is appropriate "when the 
case concerns a matter of vital public concern, where the issue will likely recur in other cases, 
where resolution of the question to be certified is outcome determinative of the case, and where 
the state supreme court has yet to have an opportunity to illuminate a clear path on the issue." 
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Pate, 275 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2001). 
As demonstrated by the parties competing motions, both parties in this case seek a 
determination of whether Utah law allows a wrongful death action for an unborn child prior to 
trial. The court, therefore, must determine whether Utah law is uncertain on the issue of whether 
a cause of action exists for the wrongful death of an unborn child. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "'the right of action to recover damages for 
death is not a common-law right, but is one created by statute.'" State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1996) (quoting Parmley v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 228 P. 557, 
560 (Utah 1924)). "The Utah wrongful death act was originally passed by the Territorial 
Legislature in 1874 to remedy the harsh effects of the common law rule which did not recognize 
wrongful death actions at all." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, 675 P.2d 1179, 1184 (Utah 
1983). Under Utah's wrongful death statute, as it existed at the time of the case in question, "a 
parent or guardian may maintain an action for the death or injury of a minor child when the injury 
or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another." Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (2006) 
amended and renumbered by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-102 (2008) (changing language from 
"may maintain" to "may bring") (emphasis added). 
The dispute between the parties in this case focuses on the meaning of the term "minor 
child." The statute does not define the term "minor child." In interpreting a statute, courts "look 
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first to the statute's plain language to determine its meaning." H. U.F. v. V.P. W.9 203 P.2d 943, 
951 (Utah 2009). When determining the meaning of a statute's plain language, "[i]t is presumed 
tha t . . . the words and phrases were chosen carefully and advisedly." Amax Magnesium Corp. v. 
Tax Comm 'n9 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990). Defendant argues that the plain language of the 
wrongful death statute provides a wrongful death action for only a minor child, not an unborn 
child. Plaintiffs, however, assert that a full-term unborn child could be considered a minor child 
under the statute. There is no provision specifically excluding an unborn child from the 
definition of minor child. 
Defendant contends it is clear that the Utah Legislature did not intend for plaintiffs to 
recover damages for the wrongful death of or injury to an unborn child because the legislature 
omitted the words "unborn child" from the wrongful death statute. Defendant contrasts this 
omission of "unborn child" in the wrongful death statute with legislature's use of the term 
"unborn child" in other provisions of the Utah Code. Under Utah's probate code, "a parent may 
represent and bind the parent's minor or unborn child if a conservator or guardian for the child 
has not been appointed." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-303(6) (emphasis added). Under Utah Code 
Annotated Section 31A-22-627(3)(a)(i), an "emergency medical condition" is defined as "placing 
the insured's health or, with respect to a pregnant women, the health of the women or her unborn 
child, in serious jeopardy." (Emphasis added.) Also, under Utah's criminal code, a person 
commits "criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, 
or acting with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute, causes the death of another human 
being, including an unborn child at any stage of its development" Id. § 76-5-201(1) (emphasis 
added)). 
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Plaintiffs argue that if the legislature intended to hold individuals criminally responsible 
for the death of an unborn child, then it would logically and morally follow that the legislature 
also intended to hold individuals civilly responsible when their wrongful actions cause the death 
of an unborn child. Plaintiffs contend that while the legislature has at times used the term 
"unborn child" to add clarity with respect to who is affected by certain laws, a failure to do so 
does not necessarily mean unborn children are not to be protected. 
Plaintiffs assert that while there are instances of the term "unborn child" being 
specifically used by the legislature in other provisions of the Utah Code, there are also other 
provisions of the code demonstrating the legislature's commitment to protecting the rights of 
unborn children. Plaintiffs specifically point to the preamble to the criminal code's abortion 
provisions, which states that "the state of Utah has a compelling interest in the protection of the 
lives of unborn children," and "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature to protect and guarantee to 
unborn children their inherent and inalienable right to life as required by Article I, Sections 1 and 
7, Utah Constitution." Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-301.1(2) and (3). 
In reviewing a separate, but related, issue under Utah's Wrongful Death statute, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that it did not need to "decide the more general question of whether the 
death of a fetus can ever provide the basis for maintaining an action under Section 78-11-6." 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1187 n.8 (Utah 1996). In Clyde, the 
court analyzed whether an unborn child's grandparents had standing to bring a wrongful death 
action under the wrongful death statute. Id. at 1185. The Clyde court addressed this issue in the 
context of whether the grandparents were entitled to underinsured motorist benefits after the 
death of their minor daughter and her unborn child. Id. 
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The Clyde court stated that "[bjecause the legislature has authorized only the 'parent or 
guardian' of a minor child to maintain an action for the child's wrongful death, the Clydes may 
not maintain an action unless they qualify as the parents or guardians of [their daughter's] unborn 
child." Id. at 1185. The Clydes asserted that because they provided their daughter's, "and 
therefore her unborn child's, sole means of support, they stood in loco parentis to the unborn 
child and should be treated as de facto parents or guardians under section 78-11-6." Id. The 
court concluded that it did not need to look past the plain language of the statute "to conclude 
that the Clydes do not qualify as the parents or guardians of [their daughter's] unborn child." Id. 
at 1186. The court found the term parent to mean only an immediate parent, not a grandparent. 
Id. 
The Clyde court also supported its conclusion by reasoning that the legislature's "failure 
to expressly include persons standing in loco parentis within the class of potential plaintiffs 
under section 78-11-6 appears to have been an intentional rejection" because the legislature had 
"used the term 'in loco parentis' in several unrelated statutes." Id. at 1187. The court found "that 
the legislature knew how to use the term 'in loco parentis' but chose not to do so in section 78-1-6 
and therefore did not intend to allow persons standing in loco parentis to maintain an action for 
the wrongful death of a minor." Id. The court concluded its analysis by explaining thai '"[t]he 
fact that the result in some circumstances may be to unreasonably restrict the class of persons 
who can bring a wrongful death action is an argument for amendment of the statute, not for our 
ignoring its words.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
Most relevant to the present case, the Clyde court then included its footnote stating that 
because the Clydes did not have standing to maintain an action for the wrongful death of their 
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unborn grandchild, it did not need to decide whether the death of an unborn child could ever 
provide the basis for a wrongful death action. The court's footnote cites to two previous Utah 
Supreme court cases. The court cited to Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114, 119 (Utah 1942), in which 
the court found that no damages are available for the loss of an unborn child, and the dissent in 
Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1079 (Utah 1975), criticizing Webb. 
Defendant asserts that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Clyde is consistent with its 
position that Utah law does not recognize a wrongful death action for an unborn child. Plaintiffs, 
however, assert that the Clyde court's footnote clearly indicated that the question was not settled. 
The Clyde court's reasoning is similar to Defendant's reasoning in this case. The plain language 
of the statute states only minor child and does not include unborn child. The fact that the 
legislature used minor child or unborn child in other statutes and not in the wrongful death statute 
indicates that the legislature did not intend to include an action for unborn children under the 
wrongful death statute. In addition, the argument for inclusion of unborn children under the 
wrongful death statute is an argument for an amendment of the statute, not for broadly 
interpreting its words or writing in words that are not present. 
The court agrees that the Utah Supreme Court could apply the reasoning of Clyde to the 
question at hand. The definition of minor child, however, does not appear to be as plain or clear 
as the definition of parent. Also, significantly, the Clyde court chose to address whether the 
grandparents had standing to assert the cause of action instead of simply stating that no such 
cause of action existed under Utah law. Additionally, the Clyde court's footnote indicates that 
the court does not consider the issue settled. The court could have cited to Webb and Nelson for 
the proposition that the issue was settled, as Defendant suggests. But, instead, the court cited to 
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Webb and Nelson's dissent criticizing Webb. 
In Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114 (Utah 1942), in which the plaintiff brought an action for 
assault and battery that resulted in a miscarriage, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
While injuries resulting in a miscarriage are 
actionable, and compensation may be awarded for 
the physical and mental sufferings by a woman who 
has a miscarriage by reason of injuries caused by the 
wrongful acts of others, damages are not awarded 
for "loss of the unborn child" itself. 
Id. at 119. 
In Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Utah 1975), the plaintiff "appealed from an 
adverse judgment based in an action for the wrongful death of a full-term fetus together with 
damages for pain and suffering allegedly caused by the negligent care of plaintiff in connection 
with the delivery of her stillborn baby." Id. at 1076. The Utah Supreme Court found the 
plaintiffs appeal of the trial court's refusal to permit recovery for the wrongful death of a full-
term fetus to be without merit as a result of Webb. Id. at 1077. The court found that the plaintiff 
could not complain about the trial court's instruction allowing her to be awarded compensation 
"for her mental distress even though the death of the fetus was not caused by a battery or by 
wilful misconduct." Id. But the court found the question of damages moot because the jury did 
not find the defendants negligent. Id. The court, however, stated that "[c]ertainly the death of a 
viable fetus should be considered as much a ground for damages as would a miscarriage. 
Whether or not it gives a different basis for recovery can be determined when liability has been 
found in a proper case." Id. at 1077-78. 
The dissent in Nelson found the plaintiffs appeal well taken and criticized the majority 
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opinion's reliance on Webb. Id. at 1079 (Maughan, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that Webb 
was "not applicable for two reasons: First, the operative facts are completely distinguishable; 
and we would not do an injustice to stare decisis for the reason that the concept advanced by that 
case is no longer a part of the weight of authority in this country." Id. (Maughan, J., dissenting). 
The dissent further argued that there was "no moral, biological, or legal rationale for sustaining 
an outmoded, dry rule laced with the fictions of a bygone era." Id. (Maughan, J., dissenting). 
The court referred to an Oregon state case where the court "rejected the view that an unborn child 
has no judicial existence apart from its mother and cites those cases representing the weight of 
authority in this country sustaining the court's opinion." Id. (Maughan, J., dissenting). 
That the Clyde court would cite to Webb and the dissent in Nelson while stating that it 
need not determine whether the death of a fetus can ever provide the basis for a wrongful death 
action convinces this court that the Utah Supreme Court views the issue as unsettled. As 
recognized by the dissent in Nelson, Webb is not necessarily controlling of the issue. The Webb 
case involved an assault and battery claim, not a wrongful death claim. As a result, the Webb 
court does not cite to or refer to the wrongful death statute. And, factually, the Webb case 
involved a pregnancy at its very early stages, not a full-term fetus as in Nelson and the present 
case. Nelson's reliance on Webb as binding is, therefore, questionable. And, the Clyde court's 
citation to Nelson's dissent calls Nelson's holding into question. 
Moreover, unlike this case, the Nelson court was reviewing the issue after a jury had 
determined that the defendants were not negligent. In this case, the court must determine 
whether evidence of damages relating to a wrongful death action can be presented at trial. The 
court agrees with the parties that the issue should be determined prior to trial. While Defendant 
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opposes certification of the question to the Utah Supreme Court, it does so only on the grounds 
that the question of law is settled. Defendant's motion in limine seeks the issue relating to 
wrongful death damages to be determined prior to trial. If the court were to wait to certify the 
question until a determination was made as to medical negligence in this case, the court would 
potentially be required to hold two trials in the matter. Judicial economy, therefore, supports a 
finding that the question should be certified and determined before the parties and court incur the 
expenditures of time and money associated with trial. 
Because the issue of whether Utah's wrongful death statute allows a wrongful death 
action for an unborn child is controlling of the motion in limine pending before the court and the 
court finds that there is no controlling Utah law, the court concludes that it is appropriate to 
certify the question to the Utah Supreme Court. This is an important issue of public policy and 
will likely recur. Moreover, certification of the issue "would further the interest of comity and 
federalism by giving the Utah Supreme Court an opportunity to answer it in the first instance 
should it elect to do so under Utah R. App. P. 41." See Ohio Cas. Ins. v. Unigardlns. Co., 2009 
WL 1160297 at *5 (10th Cir. April 28, 2009). 
Defendant's motion in limine also raises the issue of whether plaintiffs can assert 
damages other than wrongful death damages. Plaintiffs argue that Nelson stands for the 
proposition that evidence of the mother's mental anguish or suffering is admissible whether or 
not the court finds that the unborn child is covered by Utah's wrongful death statute. 542 P.2d at 
1077. Defendants, however, argue that not only can Plaintiffs not recover damages for wrongful 
death, they cannot recover any other damages related to a broader claim of medical negligence 
because Plaintiffs' Standard Form 95 stated damages only under the wrongful death category, not 
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under the personal injury category. 
If Plaintiffs had a "general claim for noneconomic damages from the loss of their child" 
that was distinct from their "more specific claim for noneconomic damages as provided by 
Utah's wrongful death statute," Defendant contends that they were required to indicate on their 
Standard Forms 95 a sum for those damages that were not wrongful death damages. "The 
[FTCA] requires that each claim and claimant meet the prerequisites for maintaining a suit 
against the government.... If the claimant fails to provide a sum certain within the claim, the 
administrative claim fails to meet the statutory prerequisite to maintaining a suit against the 
government, and leaves the district court without jurisdiction to hear the case." See Turner ex 
rel Turner v. United States, 514 F.3d 1194, 1200 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2675. 
Even though Plaintiffs failed to fill in a specific value for personal injury damages, their 
Addendum to Standard Form 95, stated that "as a result of the [doctors'] negligence, Plaintiffs . . 
. have suffered the injuries described above, including funeral expenses and general damages of 
pain and suffering, loss of affection, loss of companionship, and loss of happiness of association. 
Plaintiffs argue that they did not put an amount for personal injury damages because Sanchez did 
not suffer any personal injury. Plaintiffs claim that their damages were mental anguish resulting 
from the alleged wrongful death of their unborn child. Plaintiffs damages for medical negligence 
and wrongful death are interrelated given that the result of the alleged medical negligence was 
the death of Plaintiff s unborn child. Plaintiffs gave an exhaustive description of those claims in 
their Addendum. 
Given the level of detail provided in Plaintiffs' Addendum and the interrelated nature of 
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the damages, the court finds no prejudice to the government from Plaintiffs' failure to list 
damages in the personal injury category. The court concludes that Plaintiffs' Standard Form 95 
and their attached Addendum adequately notified Defendant that Plaintiffs were bringing a 
medical negligence claim with associated damages, not just a wrongful death claim. 
Accordingly, the court finds no jurisdictional bar to Plaintiff pursuing damages for Plaintiffs' 
mental distress associated with their medical negligence claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above reasoning, Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Question of Law to the Utah 
Supreme Court is GRANTED. This court requests the Utah Supreme Court to answer the 
following certified question, if it elects to do so: Does Utah's wrongful death statute allow an 
action for the wrongful death of an unborn child? 
As a result of the court's determination to certify this question to the Utah Supreme 
Court, the court stays its ruling on the wrongful death damages issue raised in Defendant's 
Motion in Limine to Exclude From Trial All Evidence Regarding Plaintiffs Miguel Carranza and 
Amelia Sanchez's Damages for Wrongful Death until the Utah Supreme Court rules on the 
certification order. The court also strikes the pending May 27, 2009 trial date. The court will 
reset the trial date accordingly. 
Pursuant to Rule 41(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Clerk of Court shall 
transmit a copy of this certification order, under this court's official seal, to the Utah Supreme 
Court. The Clerk of Court shall also certify a copy of any portion of the record in this case as 
may be directed by the Utah Supreme Court. 
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DATED this 14th day of May, 2009. 
DALE A. KIMBALL 
United States District Judge 
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ADDENDUM 2 
Wrongful Death and the Legal Status of the Previable Embryo: Why Illinois is on the 
Cutting Edge of Determining a Definitive Standard for Embryonic Legal Rights, 19 
Regent U.L. Rev. 251. 
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section 2.2 of the Wrongful Death Act, as well as the Abortion Law's clear definition of "human being" including the unborn child "from 
the t ime of conception," the Miller order concludes that under Illinois statutory law an embryo not yet implanted in the womb is just 
as much a human being as an embryo developing in utero. ... 
HIGHLIGHT: Philosophers and theologians may debate, but there is no doubt in the mind of the Illinois Legislature when life begins. 
I t begins at conception. * 
TEXT: 
[*251] 
I. Introduction 
In 1978, a healthy baby girl was born in northern England, * a child not of traditional in vivo 3 ferti l ization, but rather one born as a 
result of the groundbreaking technology of in vitro 4 fertil ization. The birth of Louise Joy Brown, better known as the world's f irst 
" test-tube baby," sparked a heated worldwide debate as to the ethical and biological implications of creating human life outside the 
womb. 5 This debate continued as the United States implemented its own in vitro fertilization program at the Eastern Virginia Medical 
School, 6 and when in 1981, Elizabeth Jordan Carr, the first American in vitro success, was born in Norfolk, Virginia. 7 
To some, this technology was fnghteningly reminiscent of Aldous Huxley's prophetic vision of genetically engineered children 
conceived in laboratories, while others hailed it as a medical miracle. 8 The media response initially focused on the ethical debate of 
"playing God"; however, the legal implications of in vitro fertilization quickly became [ * 2 5 2 ] relevant. For example, a 1989 article in 
Time magazine discussed the complex legal dilemmas raised by in vitro technology, including such questions as "Who should exercise 
primary rights over the frozen embryo7" and "What rights, if any, does the embryo have?"9 Today, more than twenty years after the 
inception of in vitro ferti l ization, the courts and state legislatures still struggle with these fundamental questions 
In February 2005, in a case of first impression, a Cook County district judge chose to review an interlocutory order to determine 
whether, under Ill inois law, a couple could bring a wrongful death action for the destruction of their frozen preembryo. 10 The court, in 
Miller v. American Inferti l i ty Group, held that a preembryo is a human being and should be given the same legal status as an embryo 
developing in the womb. " That determination caused the media and legal community to probe further into the important issue of 
what rights should be given to all embryos, including those cryogenically preserved. 
This note will focus on the legal status of the previable embryo I t begins with an overview of the processes of in vitro ferti l ization and 
cryopreservation. Part I I I examines the historical framework of wrongful death statutes as well as the various state statutory 
approaches to the wrongful death of an embryo Part IV focuses on the struggle to define human life in Il l inois, and whether, under 
Il l inois law, there is a wrongful death remedy for a pre-implanted embryo. Finally, Part V challenges the states to allow wrongful 
death suits for all previable embryos and proposes a guide for change through model legislation. 
This note will show why Miller v. American Infert i l i ty Group should be upheld, and why Illinois is on the cutting edge of establishing a 
definitive standard for embryonic legal rights 
I I Overview of In Vitro Fertilization and Cryopreservation 
Since the dawn of in vitro fertilization (IVF) in the late 1970s, there has been an explosion of reproductive technologies. While no 
precise figure exists, it is believed "that more than one million babies have been born worldwide since 1978" as a result of IVF. 12 In 
the United States, approximately 400 clinics offer IVF 13 and "at least 60,000 IVF [*253] procedures are performed . . . annually, 
with an average birthrate of 25%."14 
To begin the in vitro process, a woman takes fertility drugs. These fertility drugs cause the ovaries to produce several mature eggs 
(as opposed to the single egg that is naturally released each normal monthly cycle). 15 After the eggs have matured, they are 
removed from the ovaries by an IVF surgeon using a needle guided by ultrasound technology. 16 The harvested eggs are then placed 
in a Petri dish and mixed with sperm and a special medium that assists in keeping them alive. 17 Around forty-six hours after the Petri 
dish conception, a growing "embryo is a translucent, amber-colored mass of two to six cells (blastomeres)," 1S and 
within 72 hours of insemination most healthy embryos will have divided into seven to nine blastomeres. . . . By 96 hours the healthy 
embryo will have more than 80 blastomeres and will look like a mulberry, or morula, By 120 to 144 hours after insemination, most 
viable embryos will comprise more than 100 ceils and have a fluid-filled center or blastula, and are said to be at the blastocyst stage. 
19 
When the embryos have reached the blastocyst stage, the IVF surgeon will use a catheter to place several embryos into the uterus 
where ideally they will implant and continue to grow. 20 
While a normal IVF cycle can result in "one dozen to nearly three dozen eggs for fertilization," only "a few of the resulting embryos 
are implanted and . . . typically the remainder are cryopreserved."21 As of May 2003, "according to a report released by the Society 
for Assisted Reproductive Technology . . . , an estimated four hundred thousand embryos are suspended in cryotanks in IVF clinics 
across the [United States] — the largest population of frozen embryos in the world." 22 The preembryo in Miller was similarly intended 
for cryopreservation. [*254] 
I I I . Wrongful Death Statutes 
A. Historical Development of Wrongful Death Statutes 
Under the English common law, no cause of action existed for wrongful death 23 because when either the tortfeasor or the victim died 
prior to litigation of the claim, the claim died as well. 24 The tortfeasor paid no monetary price to the deceased victim's dependents or 
heirs, making it "cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him." 25 This inconsistency in the common law meant that 
"the greatest injury that one person can inflict upon another, the taking of another's life, was without civil redress." 26 The British 
Parliament rectified this injustice by passing the Fatal Accident's Act of 1846, 27 commonly referred to as Lord Campbell's Act, which 
allowed for civil suit by any "person answering the description of the widow, parent or child who, under the circumstances, suffers 
pecuniary loss."28 
In 1847, following England's lead, New York enacted a wrongful death statute patterned after Lord Campbell's Act. 29 Currently, every 
state has a statutory remedy for wrongful death that provides compensation to the victim's beneficiaries, and also provides 
deterrence for negligent behavior. 30 
B. History of Recovery for Injuries to the Unborn Child 
During the first part of the twentieth century, a tortfeasor in the United States owed no duty to the child within a woman's womb — 
only a duty to the pregnant mother. 31 Early court cases such as Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton failed to recognize any 
personhood for the unborn. 32 Dietrich addressed whether a pregnant woman could bring a civil suit for the death of her child due to a 
miscarriage induced by her [*255] fall on a defective sidewalk. 33 The court held that because the "unborn child was a part of the 
mother at the time of injury,"34 the child had no separate cause of action for "injuries received by it while in its mother's womb." 3S 
For over fifty years, the common law reflected this "single entity" view that the unborn child had no legal existence apart from the 
mother. 
However, in 1946, the court in Bonbrest v. Kotz rejected the notion that an unborn child is merely an extension of the mother. 36 
There, a baby sustained nonfatal injuries due to professional malpractice during delivery. The District Court for the District of 
Columbia denied the defendant physician's motion for summary judgment agreeing with a Canadian court's assertion that "'it is but 
natural justice that a child, if born alive and viable should be allowed to maintain an action in the courts for injuries wrongfully 
committed upon its person while in the womb of its mother.'" 37 The court explained that a "viable child being 'part' of its mother is a 
contradiction in terms" when "modern medicine is replete with cases of living children being taken from dead mothers." 38 Moreover, 
the court also recognized the previabie embryo within the womb as human life, noting that "by the eighth week the embryo . . . is an 
unmistakable human being, even though it is still only three-fourths of an inch long." 39 
This case led the way for courts to recognize a separate action for the wrongful death of an unborn child. Today, although fourteen 
states still deny recovery for the wrongful death of a child that is not born alive, 40 the majority of states allow wrongful death actions 
for the death of a "viable" unborn child. 41 Six states give ultimate value in protecting [*256] human life by recognizing a claim for 
the death of a "previabie" embryo. 42 
C. Three Jurisdictional Approaches to the Wrongful Death of a Fetus or an Embryo 
1. Live Birth 
Fourteen jurisdictions apply the most stringent test for liability, which denies all recovery for the wrongful death of a child that is not 
born alive. 43 Thus, a child wrongfully injured during birth will have no cause of action when a stillbirth results. On the other hand, the 
"live birth" requirement is satisfied even if the child dies within a few minutes of birth. 44 This rule effectuates the standard "that if the 
defendant does enough damage to terminate the life of the fetus before birth, he simply is not liable." 45 While this harsh position 
does create a bright line standard, it has been criticized for lacking an "understanding about fetal development," since "the rule 
assumes that a fetus cannot be considered a person . . . at any point prior to birth." 46 
These minority "live birth" jurisdictions advance seemingly contradictory reasoning to "support their failure to permit a cause of action 
for the wrongful death of a viable unborn child." 47 For example, in Justus v. Atchison, parents urged the California Supreme Court to 
recognize a cause of action for the wrongful death of two full-term children who were delivered stillborn due to medical negligence 
during the course of delivery. 4S The parents argued that "because California recognizes an action for prenatal injuries if a child is born 
alive, it is illogical to deny a cause of action to a different child who suffers identical prenatal injuries but dies shortly before birth 
instead of shortly thereafter."49 Nevertheless, the court's analysis centered on "whether a stillborn fetus is a 'person' within the 
meaning of the California wrongful death statute." 50 The court concluded that, based on the legislative intent behind the California 
statute, a full-term stillborn child is not a person. The court defended its upholding of the live birth view, stating: [ *257] 
In a recent development, generally opposed by the commentators, some States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an 
action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. Such an action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' 
interest and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life . . . . In short, the unborn 
have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense. S1 
While commentators may have initially opposed those states that allow a wrongful death recovery for the viable fetus, this was a 
weak argument for the California Supreme Court since at the time of the 1977 Justus decision, "twenty-five states had already 
recognized the cause of action."52 Also, because wrongful death acts compensate or even vindicate the parents for the death of their 
unborn child, it does not necessarily follow that the unborn child has no intrinsic human value Other live birth jurisdictions give 
similar illogical arguments and echo the poor conclusion of Justus "that a viable unborn child is not a person within the meaning" of 
their state's statute. 53 
In Stern v Miller, the Florida Supreme Court held that a viable unborn child is not a "'person' for purposes of [the Florida wrongful 
death statute]" despite admitting that the great weight of authority supported allowing recovery. M The court noted the following 
arguments in support of the majority viability position: 
The courts are split where, as a result of the injuries he received, the child is subsequently stillborn . . . The reasons for recovery are 
compelling A viable fetus is a human being, capable of independent existence outside the womb, a human life is therefore destroyed 
when a viable fetus is killed; it is wholly irrational to allow liability to depend on whether death from fatal injuries occurs just before or 
just after birth; it is absurd to allow recovery for prenatal injuries unless they are so severe as to cause death; such a situation favors 
the wrongdoer who causes death over the one who merely causes injuries, and so enables the tortfeasor to foreclose his own liability. 
55 
However, the Florida Supreme Court dismissed these compelling grounds for recognizing the viable unborn child as human life, and 
instead focused on the intent of the legislature to limit recovery to a "minor child," concluding "that a stillborn fetus is not within the 
statutory classification."56 
Similarly, in the leading minority case of Witty v. American General Capital Distributors, Inc , the Texas Supreme Court recognized 
that an [*258] unborn child has "an existence separate from its mother" and that the live birth jurisdictions are substantially 
outnumbered by those states adopting the majority rule 57 Yet, the court still refused to allow a mother to collect wrongful death 
damages for her child's death resulting from prenatal injuries 58 
While many of the early live birth cases have been "subsequently overruled by judicial or legislative action,"59 California, Florida, and 
Texas, as well as eleven other jurisdictions, still continue to hold to their minority position of no recovery for the wrongful death of an 
unborn child. 
2. Viability 
The majority of jurisdictions do permit fetal wrongful death actions on the condition that the child is "viable" at the time of death. 60 A 
viable child is one that is capable of living outside the womb 61 The concept of legal viability "was first suggested by Justice Boggs of 
the Illinois Supreme Court in his dissent to Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital " 62 The majority opinion in Allaire held that an infant could 
not maintain a cause of action for nonfatal injuries received within the womb However, in dissent, Justice Boggs argued that if the 
child had received an injury in utero, which later after birth caused the child's death, the common law would treat this as a punishable 
injury to a human being. Thus, it follows that one who inflicts nonfatal injuries on a child in the womb should also be punished: 63 
The law should, it seems to me, be that whenever a child in utero is so far advanced in prenatal age as that, should by parturition by 
natural or artificial means occur at such age, such child could and would live separable from the mother, and grow into the ordinary 
activities of life, and is afterwards born, and becomes a living human being, such child has a right of action for any injuries wantonly 
or negligently inflicted upon his or her person at such age of viability, though then in the womb of the mother. 64 
In 1949, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Verkennes v. Corniea, first rejected the live birth requirement in favor of the viability rule. 
65
 [*259] The court held that a cause of action would lie when a stillbirth results from prenatal injuries to a viable unborn child. 66 
In refuting the common law belief that the child in utero is merely an extension of the woman's anatomy, Verkennes cited several 
cases including Bonbrest v Kotz 67 and Judge Boggs's dissent in Allaire. 6S Verkennes led the way for other jurisdictions to expand 
liability for the wrongful death of a viable child within the womb. 
3. Previability 
Currently, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, South Dakota, and West Virginia have extended wrongful death liability to those 
injuries causing the death of a previable child. Of these six, "five permit the cause of action at any point during gestation. Georgia 
alone uses 'quickening' as the point when a wrongful death action is recognized." 69 
In Georgia, Tucker v. Carmichae! & Sons first broached the issue of whether an infant could recover damages for prenatal injuries. 
The state's highest court held in the affirmative for the child, emphasizing that life begins "when the child is able to stir in the 
mother's womb." 70 Four years later, a Georgia appellate court, in Porter v. Lassiter, ruled that an action may be maintained for the 
death of an unborn child who was "quick" or "able to move in the mother's womb" at the time of death. 71 In this case, the mother 
was approximately six weeks pregnant at the time of the accident and was four and a half months pregnant when a miscarriage 
occurred 72 The court determined that the Georgia Code, which allows suit for the wrongful death of a "child," included that of a 
"quickened" fetus because it also declares that "the wilful killing of an unborn child so far developed as to be ordinarily called 'quick', 
sic is considered as murder."73 Therefore, "as a result of the Porter decision, Georgia became the first state to allow wrongful death 
recovery for the death of an unborn fetus that may not be viable at the time of the tortious act." 7A 
In 1981, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Danos v. St. Pierre initially denied recovery for a six-month-old fetus that suffered prenatal 
[*260] injury and was subsequently stillborn. 7S However, upon rehearing, the court reversed and allowed the parents of the 
deceased child to recover for the wrongful death. 76 To support its ruling, the court reasoned, "The loss to parents of a child who 
otherwise would have been born normally is substantially the same, whether the tortfeasor's fault causes the child to be born dead or 
to die shortly after being born alive . . . ."77 Also, recent Louisiana legislation had pronounced "that a human being exists from the 
moment of fertilization and implantation."78 Danos also rejected the argument that an unborn child is a part of the mother's anatomy, 
stating; 
We believe the infant is a child from the moment of its conception although life may be in a state of suspended animation the subject 
of love, affection, and hope and that the injury or killing of it, in its mother's womb . . . gives the bereaved parents a right of action 
against the guilty parties for their grief, and mental anguish. 79 
Missouri courts held to the position that a viable fetus is not a "person" within Missouri's wrongful death statute until the 1983 case of 
O'Grady v. Brown. 80 In Rambo v. Lawson, the Supreme Court of Missouri declined to extend liability to a previable fetus that died in 
utero as a result of an automobile accident.81 However, the court reversed itself in 1995 and allowed recovery for the wrongful death 
of a previable child at four months gestation.82 In examining the statutory intent behind state abortion regulation, which in part says 
that "the life of each human being begins at conception" and that "unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-
being," the court found that the general assembly had directed "that the time of conception and not viability is the determinative 
point at which the legally protected rights, privileges, and immunities should be deemed to arise." 83 
In 1984, South Dakota specifically amended its statute to include the wrongful death of an unborn child. M In 1986, the Supreme 
Court of South Dakota held that even under the pre-amendment statute, because of the "'clear, overwhelming and growing majority 
of jurisdictions' permitting actions in such cases, a cause of action for the death of a [*261] viable, unborn fetus did exist under the 
former wrongful death statute."85 
The court further held in Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms that South Dakota's amended wrongful death statute provides a cause of 
action for the Joss of the previable unborn child. 86 In this case, parents had brought a wrongful death action against a frozen food 
company claiming that the company's salmonella-contaminated chicken had caused the mother to miscarry. At the time of the 
miscarriage, the unborn child was clearly previable at only seven weeks gestation. 87 The court focused its analysis on the 
construction of the statute, and found that by amending the statute to include an "unborn child" and not a "fetus or embryo," the 
legislature meant to "include any child still within a mother's womb." 88 Furthermore, the intent of the legislature is seen where an 
"unborn child" in criminal statutes is defined as "'an individual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth.'" 
89
 The court also noted that apart from balancing "the privacy rights of the mother against her unborn child," the term "viability is 
purely an arbitrary milestone from which to reckon a child's legal existence," since this is a relative matter that may vary depending 
on the mother's health and other factors apart from the state of development. 90 
In West Virginia, the landmark case of Farley v. Sartin declared that a previable fetus is a "person" within the meaning of West 
Virginia's wrongful death statute. 91 In Farley, the plaintiff's pregnant wife was killed in an auto accident along with their child who 
had developed to approximately eighteen weeks gestation. The court held that 
justice is denied when a tortfeasor is permitted to walk away with impunity because of the happenstance that the unborn child has 
not yet reached viability at the time of death. . . . Our concern reflects the fundamental value determination of our society that life — 
old, young, and prospective — should not be wrongfully taken away. 92 
[*262] 
IV. Illinois' Struggle to Define Human Life 
A. Illinois Wrongful Death Act 93 
The Illinois Wrongful Death Act, "enacted by the General Assembly in 1853, created for the first time in Illinois a cause of action for 
death." 94The Act patterns the 1847 New York statute, which substantially copied Lord Campbell's Act. 95 
In 1973, Justice Ryan in his dissent to Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg asked: "'Why set the line of demarcation at viability? Why 
should not a cause of action exist for the death of a fetus in its previable state?'" 96 In 1980, the Illinois Legislature enacted section 
2.2 of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act which states: 
The state of gestation or development of a human being when an injury is caused, when an injury takes effect, or at death, shall not 
foreclose maintenance of any cause of action under the law of this State arising from the death of a human being caused by wrongful 
act, neglect or default. 97 
Senator Rhoads introduced this bill by explaining that while at the time case law permitted "'the representative of the unborn child at 
viability to bring a cause of action for wrongful death[,]'" there was no case law clarifying the gap between conception and viability, a 
gap that section 2.2 would now fill. 98 
B. Illinois Case History 
1. Case History Prior to Miller v. American Infertility Group 
In 1973, the Supreme Court of Illinois in Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg first addressed whether under the Illinois Wrongful Death 
Act parents could recover for the wrongful death of a child who dies in [*263] the womb. 99 During her thirty-sixth week of 
pregnancy, an automobile negligently struck Mrs. Chrisafogeorgis, later causing her baby boy to be stillborn. The Court had previously 
held in Amman v. Faidy 10° that "there is a right of action for injuries wrongfully sustained by a viable child . . when the child 
survives the injuries and is born alive." 101 In Chnsafogeorgis, the court chose to extend this liability to a viable fetus that dies in 
utero. 102 The court cited cases from other jurisdictions which described the bizarre results of only allowing recovery for a child who is 
born alive. "For example, a doctor or a midwife whose negligent acts in delivering a baby produced the baby's death would be legally 
immune from a lawsuit However if they badly injured the child they would be exposed to liability." 103 Justice Ryan further argued in 
his dissent that the distinction between viability and nonviability is relative and thus causes similarly incongruous results as the 
distinction made between a child who dies shortly before birth and one who dies shortly thereafter. 104 
In Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, the court held that an infant could maintain an action against the hospital for injuries sustained 
from a negligent blood transfusion given to the mother prior to the child's conception 105 The court noted that viability is a relative 
matter and that "denial of claims for injuries to the previable fetus may indeed cut off some of the most meritorious claims, for there 
is substantial medical authority that congenital structural defects caused by factors in the prenatai environment can be sustained only 
early in the previable stages " 106 While Renslow did not address wrongful death, it did cast doubt on upholding viability as the 
standard for recovery. 
One year after Renslow, the court in Green v Smith addressed whether a father could recover for the wrongful death of a child who 
died in utero at fourteen weeks gestation. 107 The court held that unless the fetus was viable, there would be no recovery, and that 
viability was a question of fact to be determined by the jury. 108 The court distinguished this from Renslow by stating: 
In our opinion there is a clear distinction between a common law cause of action on behalf of a live-born infant for injuries suffered 
prior to its 
[*264J 
having become viable, and a statutory cause of action for the destruction of a fetus not yet viable The extent of the loss incurred by a 
living child burdened with mental or physical defects resulting from a prenatal occurrence is not affected by whether the injuries were 
suffered prior to or after he became viable. On the other hand, the Wrongful Death Act provides for recovery for the "death of a 
person," and we find no basis upon which to hold that one can cause the death of a fetus not yet viable 109 
However, in 1980, the Illinois legislature amended the Wrongful Death Act to clarify that age of gestation will not bar recovery for the 
wrongful death of a developing child 110 Seef v Sutkus is the primary case addressing the wrongful death of a fetus following the 
amended legislation. X11 In Seef, a child was stillborn at thirty-eight weeks after a physician and hospital negligently failed to monitor 
the child and to perform a timely c-section 112 The parents sought pecuniary damages for loss of the child's society. 113 The court 
explained that because section 2.2 of the Wrongful Death Act prohibits limitation of a wrongful death claim based on the state of 
gestation or development, "an unborn fetus is recognized as a 'person' and parents may recover damages for 'pecuniary injuries' 
resulting from the death of the unborn fetus." 114 The concurring opinion clarifies that the 1980 legislation eliminates the viability 
requirement of Chnsafogeorgis; however, the amount of pecuniary damages that the parents may recover is a separate issue. l l s 
Illinois has led the way in enacting legislation that provides recovery for the wrongful death of a previable fetus. Recently, Miller v 
American Infertility Group raised the important issue of whether the right of recovery given under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act to 
any "'state of gestation or development of a human being'" includes not only an embryo developing in the womb, but also an embryo 
artificially created and preserved in vitro, outside the womb. 116 
2. Miller v American Infertility Group 
Allison Miller and her husband, Todd Parish, sought treatment for [*265] infertility from the Center for Human Reproduction in 
Illinois (Center) 117 In the typical preparation for in vitro fertilization, 118 the Center harvested Allison's eggs and then fertilized them 
with Todd's sperm As a result, nine viable embryos were created and then frozen so that they could later be implanted in Allison's 
uterus The couple believed "that at least one of these embryos developed into a healthy blastocyst", however, it was wrongfully 
destroyed by the Center on or around January 13, 2000. 119 Allison and Todd first learned of their loss in June 2000 when they wished 
to transfer the embryo to another facility. The Center notified them by letter stating: "Based on our records, one of our junior 
embryologists informed you that we would freeze one embryo at the blastocyst stage . . . A [senior embryologist] then decided not 
to cryopreserve this embryo." 120 
Miller and Parish filed suit against the Center and their complaint consisted of three counts including claims for negligence, willful and 
wanton misconduct, breach of contract, and wrongful death On May 4, 2004, Judge David Lichtenstein dismissed with prejudice the 
claims based on negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, and breach of contract "with leave to replead, provided that the 
references to the Wrongful Death Act were removed " 12t Upon dismissal, Miller and Parish moved to reconsider The court (with a 
new judge, as the previous trial judge had retired) denied the motion, refusing to reconsider the original order. The plaintiffs again 
moved for reconsideration, and Judge Jeffery Lawrence chose to review Lichtenstein's dismissal order and the order denying 
reconsiderations. 122 
A trial judge has the authority to revisit interlocutory orders — those orders that do not dispose of "all the counts or issues in the 
case." 123 Lawrence chose to review these orders since the case "involves an issue of public importance which is apparently one of first 
impression in Illinois." 124 
Not only is this an issue of first impression for Illinois, but one for almost all jurisdictions, with the exception being Rhode Island In 
Frisma v Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island, the Superior Court of Rhode Island held that three couples could not maintain an 
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress against a fertility [*266] clinic following the loss and destruction of several frozen 
embryos. 125 In analyzing whether the destroyed preembryos were victims, the court cited various cases from other jurisdictions 
where frozen embryos were "'not recognized as 'persons' for constitutional purposes."' i26 Also, the court deferred to Miccolis v. Arnica 
Mutua' Insurance Co., 127 in which it had held "that a previable fetus is not a 'person' within the meaning of the wrongful death 
statute."128 The Prisma court held that this "would also preclude pre-embryos from being considered victims." x29 Because Rhode 
Island holds to the viability approach for the wrongful death of the unborn, Fnsma's failure to extend legal rights to the frozen embryo 
is not surprising 
In Miller, Judge Lawrence presented two key issues. "(1) is a pre-embryo a 'human being' within the meaning of Sec. 2.2 of the 
Wrongful Death Act, and (2) must it be implanted in its mother's uterus to give rise to a claim under the Act for its destruction?" 130 
In analyzing whether section 2.2 of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act includes legal standing for the preembryo, as it does for the 
previable embryo, Miller emphasizes that the "words in a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning." i 3 1 In 1980, section 
2.2 was added to the Wrongful Death Act. It states: "The state of gestation or development of a human being when an injury is 
caused . . . shall not foreclose maintenance of any cause of action . . . arising from the death of a human being caused by wrongful 
a c t . . . ." 132 This amendment was sponsored by Senator Rhoads, who believed the bill would "'close a gap in the current law, both 
case and statutory law, covering that period . . . from the time of conception to the time of viability."' 133 
However, neither Rhoads nor any of the other legislators attempted to define "human being." When necessary, the court may use 
"legislative history and the language of other statutes concerning related subject matter" to discern statutory construction. 134 While 
the Wrongful Death Act fails to define "human being," the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 does [*267] define the term. 135 According 
to Miller, the Abortion Law makes it clear that while "philosophers and theologians may debate . . . there is no doubt in the mind of 
the Illinois Legislature when life begins. It begins at conception." 136 Section 1 of the Abortion Law declares: 
The General Assembly of the State of Illinois do solemnly declare and find in reaffirmation of the longstanding policy of this State, that 
the unborn child is a human being from the time of conception and is, therefore, a legal person for purposes of the unborn child's 
right to life and is entitled to the right to life from conception under the laws and Constitution of this State. 137 
Section 2 of the Illinois Abortion Law states that: 
(5) "Fertilization" and "conception" each mean the fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm, which shall be deemed to have 
occurred at the time when it is known a spermatozoon has penetrated the cell membrane of the ovum. 
(6) "Fetus" and "unborn child" each mean an individual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth. 138 
Because of the legislative intent behind section 2.2 of the Wrongful Death Act, as well as the Abortion Law's clear definition of "human 
being" including the unborn child "from the time of conception," the Miller order concludes that under Illinois statutory law an embryo 
not yet implanted in the womb is just as much a human being as an embryo developing in utero. 139 
The second issue addressed by Miller is whether a preembryo must be implanted in its mother's uterus to give rise to a claim under 
the Wrongful Death Act. Judge Lawrence again turns to the construction of the amendment. Although Rhoads's discussion of the bill 
focuses on the term "gestation," the final version of amendment section 2.2 reads "gestation or development of a human being." 14° 
Because section 2.2 also includes the term development, and not merely the term gestation, "it is a reasonable inference that [the 
legislature] must have contemplated nongestational development or development outside the womb." 141 In conclusion, Miller finds 
that it would be illogical to "allow a claim for the death of a human being after implantation in its mother's womb but deny it for one 
before implantation." 142 [*268] 
V. Proposal 
A. Why All States Should Permit Recovery for the Wrongful Death of Both Previable Embryos and Preembryos 
1. Natural Law Tradition of Valuing Life 
If men strive, and hurt a woman with child, so that her fruit depart from her, and yet no mischief follow: he shall be surely punished . 
. . and he shall pay as the judges determine. And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life . . . . i43 
Many jurisdictions, struggling with the determination of when life truly begins, have cited Blackstone to support a position of valuing 
early human life. For example, Justice Boggs, in his dissent in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, cited Blackstone in support of the then 
innovative concept of legal viability. 144 Blackstone, reflecting the principle of justice for the unborn in Exodus 21:22, states: 
The right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and 
his reputation. 
1. Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an 
infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion, or otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or 
if any one beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by the 
ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But [the modern law] doth not look upon this offense in quite so atrocious a light, but merely 
as a heinous misdemeanor. 
An infant in ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed in law to be born for many purposes. I t is capable of having a 
legacy . . . . It may have a guardian assigned to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to take afterwards by 
such limitation, as if it were then actually born. And in this point the civil law agrees with ours. 145 
Verkennes v. Corniea, the first case to reject the live birth requirement and adopt the viability standard, cited Blackstone in support of 
its expansion of legal rights for the unborn. 146 Both Boggs's dissent in Allaire and the majority in Verkennes found inconsistency 
between the current property and criminal law which treated the unborn as human "from the moment of conception," and the law of 
negligence [ * 2 6 9 ] which continued to treat the child as part of the mother. 147 Blackstone first emphasized this contradiction and 
declared that life begins "as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb." 148 
In the Illinois Supreme Court case of Amman v. Faidy, the court similarly cited Blackstone in support of its decision to allow an infant 
to maintain an action for prenatal injuries when it stated, " I t would therefore seem to us to be an unwarranted reflection upon the 
common law itself to attribute to it a greater concern for the protection of property than for the protection of the person." 149 
The natural law, as reflected by Blackstone, gives foundational support for valuing human life and not treating the death of the 
unborn as a mere misdemeanor, but rather as an offense equal to that of the wrongful death of any other human being. 
2. Scientific Evidence that the Previable Embryo is Human Life 
In Davis v. Davis, a mother sought custody of seven cryogenically frozen embryos following a divorce. 15° Her ex-husband desired 
custody in order to have the embryos destroyed. At the trial in Maryville, Tennessee, world renowned French geneticist Jerome 
Lejeune, M.D., Ph.D., testified to the humanity of the frozen embryos. 151 Lejeune passionately articulated that life begins at 
conception: 
Each of us has a unique beginning, the moment of conception . . . . As soon as the twenty-three chromosomes carried by the sperm 
encounter the twenty-three chromosomes carried by the ovum, the whole information necessary and sufficient to spell out all the 
characteristics of the new being is gathered." 1S2 
Lejeune went on to speak of the unnecessary and potentially misleading terminology of labeling a frozen embryo a preembryo since 
before an embryo there is a sperm and an egg, and that's it. And the sperm and the egg cannot be a pre-embryo because you cannot 
tell what embryo it will be, because you don't know what sperm will go into what egg, but once it is made, you have got a zygote and 
when it divides it's an embryo and that's it. 
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I think it's important because people would believe that a pre-embryo does not have the same significance as an embryo. And in fact, 
on the contrary, a first cell knows more and is more specialized . . . than any cell which is later in our organism. 153 
Lejeune's testimony is filled with detailed explanation of scientific advancements concerning the genetic code and the beginning of 
life. He describes the process of freezing embryos as placing them in a "concentration can." 154This "can" does not stop life, to be 
later started anew after thawing. Rather, the low temperatures greatly slow down cells' microscopic movements and arrest "the flux 
of t ime" for the embryo, which if thawed "will again begin to flourish and to divide." 155 Lejeune clarifies that 
an early human being in this suspended t ime inside the can, cannot be the property of anybody because he is the only one in the 
world to have the property of building himself. And I would say that science has a very simple conception of man; as soon as he has 
been conceived, a man is a man. 156 
The trial court heard from a total of seven experts in the fields of genetics, embryology, and in vitro fert i l izat ion, four of which agreed 
"that the seven cryopreserved embryos are human; that is, 'belonging or relating to man.'" 157 Based on their determination that the 
embryos were human beings, the trial court awarded the mother custody so that she would have the opportunity to bring the children 
to term through implantation. However, the court of appeals reversed, holding that "'the parties share an interest in the seven 
ferti l ized ova"' and remanded the case to the trial court to give them "' joint control . . . and equal voice over their disposition."' 158 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the husband's interests outweighed the wife's, and thus the husband was entitled to 
custody of the embryos and had the ability to determine whether the embryos should be destroyed. The final outcome of Davis 
resulted in Tennessee adopting the standard that "preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'property, ' but occupy an 
interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life." 159 
Although Tennessee chose to treat frozen embryos as quasi-property, the testimony of Jerome Lejeune, as well as his research and 
that of others within the scientific community, gives strong evidence for [ * 2 7 1 ] supporting the standard that human life begins 
from the moment the sperm fertilizes the ovum. 
The law has long given deference to scientific advancement in the shaping of legal rights given to the unborn. For example, in 1900 
Justice Boggs argued that 
medical science and skill . . . have demonstrated that at a period of gestation in advance of the period of parturi t ion the foetus is 
capable of independent and separate life, and that, though within the body of the mother, it is not merely a part of her body, for her 
body may die in all of its parts and the child remain alive, and capable of maintaining life, when separated f rom the dead body of the 
mother. . . . Is it not sacrificing truth to a mere theoretical abstraction to say the injury was not to the child, but wholly to the 
mother? 160 
In Bonbrest v. Kotz, the landmark case which rejected the notion that an unborn child is merely an extension of the mother, the court 
used current science to correct an error in the law. 161 The court held that because "modern medicine is replete with cases of living 
children being taken from dead mothers," a fetus can no longer be treated as legally one with the mother. 162 
Like Bonbrest and other cases which have used the understanding of modern medicine and human development to correct a 
scientifically outdated law, states should specifically amend their wrongful death statutes to reflect the current scientific evidence that 
life begins at conception. Not only must the law give rights to embryos in utero, but also to those embryos which are fully human but 
not yet implanted within the womb. "Once conceived, a man is a man." 163 
3. Inconsistency in Distinguishing In Vivo and In Vitro Previable Embryos 
Those jurisdictions which reject the viability standard in favor of allowing wrongful death recovery for a previable embryo have justly 
done so in part due to the relativity and inconsistency of the viability standard. Likewise, Justice Ryan's concurrence in Green v. Smith 
argues for abandoning the viability standard in favor of a more definite standard. 164 Ryan argues that 
viability is . . . dependent upon the weight and race of the child and the techniques which are presently available to sustain the life of 
the fetus outside the womb. . . . For this court to base its determination 
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that an unborn child becomes a 'person' only at the point of viability is to premise the right to maintain an action for wrongful death 
on an uncertain and continually changing standard. 16S 
However, it is similarly inconsistent for those jurisdictions that have extended legal rights to the previable embryo in the womb to 
deny the same rights to the frozen previable embryo. The only difference between those embryos is that an in vivo embryo has 
implanted within the lining of the uterus. 166 Implantation, however, is not a definite standard for determining human legal status, 
since it can occur anywhere from six to twelve days after fertilization of the ovum. 167 
The best standard supported by scientific evidence is that of conception. From a legal standpoint, the actual date of conception may 
be less significant for naturally conceived children; however, it is crucial for those children conceived through in vitro fertilization, 
since in those cases one can pinpoint the precise timing of conception. The moment that the sperm fertilizes the egg — whether inside 
or outside of a woman's body — human life begins. Wrongful death law, as in Miller v. American Infertility Group, should reflect this 
definite standard. 
B. Model Legislation 
Below is suggested legislation which states may use as a model to amend their Wrongful Death Acts to reflect modern scientific 
understanding of human development and give equal legal rights to in vivo and in vitro human life. 
The state of gestation of a human being or the location of a developing human being when an injury is caused, when an injury takes 
effect, or at death, shall not bar any cause of action under the law of this State arising from the death of a human being caused by 
wrongful act, neglect or default. 
A "human being" is an individual organism of the species homo sapiens beginning with the moment of conception, meaning the 
fertilization of a human ovum with a human sperm. Any form of preservation of a fertilized human ovum does not change its status as 
a human being. 16S 
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VI. Conclusion 
All jurisdictions have struggled to define when human life reaches the stage of development that will warrant recovery for wrongful 
death. The answer to this struggle is modeled both by Illinois' statutory and case law. The legislation protects the previable embryo, 
as does Miller v. American Infertility Group, which affirms that human life exists from conception until death. According to Miller, even 
previable frozen embryos should be recognized under wrongful death law as persons with legal status equal to that of a living child. 
Other previability jurisdictions should make the logical step to include rights not only for previable embryos in the womb, but also for 
those created and preserved through in vitro procedures. Those jurisdictions which still hold to the scientifically outdated standard of 
"live birth," as well as those which hold to the inconsistent standard of "viability" for wrongful death recovery, should follow Illinois' 
lead and amend their legislation to adopt "conception" as the definitive standard for embryonic legal rights. 
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"•T1166 Implantation is defined as "attachment of the fertilized ovum (blastocyst) to the endometr ium, and its subsequent embedding 
in the compact layer." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 490. 
* n l 6 7 Allen J. Wilcox, Donna Day Baird & Clarice R. Weinberg, Time of Implantation of the Conceptus and Loss of Pregnancy, 340 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1796, 1797 (1999). 
• n l 6 8 This model legislation is a modification of section 2.2 of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/2.2 
(2002). 
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Primer on Legal Recognition & Protection 
of Unborn & Newly Born 
By Denise M. Burke 
Vice President of Legal Affairs, Americans United for Life 
T he unimaginable grief and suffering en-dured by Laci and Conner Peterson's 
family has, largely due to their own coura-
geous advocacy, been transformed into a blow 
for justice on behalf of unborn victims of crim-
inal violence. In April 2004, President Bush 
signed the "Unborn Victims of Violence Act", 
more commonly known as "Laci and Conner's 
Law," filling an important gap in federal law. 
Federal prosecutors may now charge an assail-
ant in the death of an unborn child when the 
death occurs on federal property, such as mili-
tary installations, or when the death stems from 
the commission of a federal crime. 
More importantly, Laci and Conner lived in 
a state (California) where prosecutors could 
press murder charges for the deaths of both this 
young mother and her unborn son. Thirty-six 
states carry such provisions in their criminal 
law, often referred to as fetal homicide laws. 
As for the remaining 14 states, Laci Peter-
son's mother, Sharon Rocha, has said it best, 
that they are in effect telling grieving families 
that "innocent victims [like Cornier] are not re-
ally victims—indeed that they never existed at 
all." 
Twenty years ago, the picture was even more 
bleak. The vast majority of states followed the 
outdated born-alive rule, requiring an unborn 
victim to be born after the assault, and then to 
die, before prosecutors could press charges. 
Thanks in large part to research and advocacy 
by Clarke D. Forsythe of Americans United for 
Life (AUL), this picture has changed, includ-
ing the enactment of the California law which 
permitted prosecutors to file charges for the 
deaths of both Laci and Conner Petersen. 
Unborn victims of violence laws are just one 
example of how states may provide legal rec-
ognition of and protection for the unborn out-
side the context of abortion. There are several 
more available under both criminal and civil 
statutes. 
Issues 
Fetal Homicide 
In recent years, several high-profile cases from 
across the nation have highlighted the need for 
laws protecting unborn victims from criminal 
violence. Perhaps most notably, the tragic 
deaths of Laci and Conner Peterson have fo-
cused much-needed attention on this critically 
important issue. Currently, 36 states provide 
some degree of protection for unborn victims 
of homicide. 
Under common law,1 the killing of an unborn 
child was not considered a homicide unless 
the child was first born alive and then died as 
a result of a criminal prenatal act. This rule, 
called "the bom-alive rule," is still followed in 
a majority of states that have not enacted spe-
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cial legislation to protect unborn children from 
criminal violence. Thus, if someone shoots a 
pregnant woman, killing her child, he or she 
is not subject to criminal prosecution for the 
murder of the child unless the child is first bora 
alive and then dies as a result of the injuries 
which the child sustained before birth. The 
purpose of the laws protecting unborn victims 
of homicide, also know as fetal homicide laws, 
is to overturn the common law born-alive rule 
and criminalize conduct causing the death of 
an unborn child. These laws are not directed 
at abortion which, under current constitutional 
doctrine, is protected. 
Nonfatal Assaults on the Unborn 
On occasion, the assailant's attack does not 
result in the death of the unborn child, but in-
stead injures the child in utero (perhaps also 
resulting in a premature delivery). In such in-
stances, 21 states permit the prosecution of the 
assailant for assault. 
One-Victim Laws 
A minority of jurisdictions—11 states—have 
enacted one-victim laws that permit prosecu-
tions and enhanced penalties in cases where a 
woman is assaulted and suffers a miscarriage, 
stillbirth, or "damage to [her] pregnancy." No-
tably, of these states, six do not have another 
law (such as a fetal homicide law) that recog-
nizes the unborn child as a second victim of 
the attack.2 
Prevention and Treatment of Maternal Drug 
and Alcohol Abuse 
In recent years, a number of states have passed 
laws providing protection for women and their 
children from the ravages of drug and alcohol 
abuse. The intent of these laws is not to crimi-
nalize the mother's use of drugs and/or alco-
hol, but to provide, encourage, and, in some 
cases, mandate reporting and treatment. Simi-
larly, 20 states fund special drug and alcohol 
treatment programs for pregnant women and 
newborns. 
Civil Causes of Action for the Wrongful Death 
of an Unborn Child 
Moreover, by court decision or statute, 38 states 
allow a wrongful death (civil) cause of action 
for the death of an unborn child.3 Of these, 29 
states allow a wrongful death suit if the child is 
viable; nine states allow suits for a pre-viable 
unborn child; and 12 states still require a live 
birth, barring a cause of action for the death of 
the unborn child unless the child is born alive 
and dies thereafter. 
Refusal to Recognize Wrongful Life 
or Wrongful Birth Lawsuits 
A number of states also refuse to recognize 
wrongful life or wrongful birth causes of ac-
tion. "Wrongful life" is an "action...brought 
by or on behalf of the child...[who] alleges, 
because of the defendant's negligence, his par-
ents either decided to conceive him ignorant 
of the risk of an impairment or birth defect or 
were deprived of information during gestation 
that would have prompted them to terminate 
the pregnancy."4 Simply put, in a wrongful life 
action, a child is arguing that (1) the pregnancy 
should have been terminated; (2) that "but for 
the defendant's negligence" the plaintiff would 
not have been born; and (3) the plaintiff's life 
would have been better not lived.5 
Meanwhile, "wrongful birth" is an "action 
brought by the parent of a child born with an 
impairment or birth defect." The basic argu-
ment made by the parent is that he/she would 
have aborted the child if he/she had known that 
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the child would be disabled.6 Since the birth 
defect is naturally occurring, "[tjhe parent al-
leges that the negligence of those charged with 
prenatal testing or genetic counseling deprived 
them of the right to make a timely decision 
regarding whether to terminate a pregnancy 
because of the likelihood their child would be 
born physically or mentally impaired."7 
Wrongful life and wrongful birth claims raise 
significant issues because their core arguments 
attack the sanctity of life of every human per-
son—these claims assert that some lives are 
better off not lived, that the disabled are bet-
ter off dead.8 To term children with disabilities 
"defective'* and advocate for their elimination 
prior to birth is to dangerously re-classify the 
disabled as less human, to grant these citizens 
fewer rights, and to attribute a lower value to 
their lives and contributions to humanity. "9 
Currently, 29 states have either refused to rec-
ognize or limited a wrongful life action, while 
three states expressly permit this controversial 
cause of action. 
Unfortunately, wrongful birth causes of action 
have found significantly greater acceptance by 
state courts, legislatures, and the public. Thir-
ty-two states permit wrongful birth causes of 
action, while only 11 states expressly prohibit 
such causes of action. 
Myths & Facts 
Myth: Laws extending legal recognition and 
protection to unborn children are unconstitu-
tional because they give legal status to an un-
born child and/or contradict the established 
tenets of Roe v. Wade. 
Fact: Despite numerous challenges, no law 
protecting unborn children outside the context 
of abortion have been struck down as unconsti-
tutional. Moreover, these laws do not directly 
implicate the right to choose an abortion. For 
example, unborn victims of violence laws, also 
known as fetal homicide laws, specifically ex-
clude the performance of a legal abortion from 
potential criminal liability. They also do not 
apply to conduct to which the mother of the 
unborn child (or her legal guardian) consents, 
such as medical treatment or an abortion. 
Myth: Crimes that result in the death of or 
injury to an unborn child are merely offenses 
against the pregnant woman, with death or 
harm to the unborn child being an incidental or 
accidental consequence. 
Fact: The failed effort by Senator Dianne 
Feinstein (D-CA) to gut "Laci and Conner's 
Law" (by making assault on a pregnant woman 
an ''enhanced offense" if her unborn child also 
dies) sought to perpetuate this view. Noth-
ing, in fact, could be further from the truth. In 
many cases involving violence against preg-
nant women, the assailant attacks a pregnant 
woman with the intent of killing the unborn 
child by causing a miscarriage or stillbirth. In 
some, the woman refused to have an abortion 
and the child's father, rather than respecting her 
choice, reacts violently to end the pregnancy. 
In these situations, women have been savagely 
beaten, pushed down flights of stairs, and suf-
fered blows, stab wounds, and gunshots target-
ed to the abdomen. Sometimes, this violence 
takes a less savage, but no less deadly turn. In 
2002, an Ohio physician whose pregnant girl-
friend had refused to have an abortion spiked 
her drink with a prescription drug known to 
cause miscarriage. 
Myth: Now that we have the federal "Unborn 
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Victims of Violence Act," there is no need to 
pass similar state protections. 
Fact: Murder and assaults, except in limited 
circumstances, are typically state crimes. The 
vast majority of the criminal prosecutions for 
homicide and assault take place in state courts, 
not in federal courts, so it is critical that each 
state protect the unborn from criminal vio-
lence. Conversely, "Laci and Conner's Law" 
only applies to federal crimes and federal juris-
dictions, such as military installations. 
Thus, the biggest impact of "Laci and Conner's 
Law" may be in its revisions to the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Military 
prosecutors can now pursue charges against 
military personnel stationed anywhere in the 
world if their actions cause the death of an un-
born child; previously, they were limited to fil-
ing such charges only in those states with laws 
protecting unborn victims of violence. A case 
such as that of Airman Gregory L. Roberts, 
who in 1996 savagely beat his pregnant wife, 
rupturing her uterus and killing their unborn 
daughter, resulted in manslaughter charges 
only because Ohio, where he was stationed, had 
such a law on its books. Had Roberts been sta-
tioned in Colorado or North Carolina—states 
with a significant military presence, but no law 
protecting an unborn child from violence—he 
could not have been charged with his daugh-
ter's death and would have faced prosecution 
only for the assault on his wife. 
For more information about unborn victims of violence laws, see 
the "Quick Reference Table'' in the Appendix. 
Endnote 
1
 As distinguished from laws created by the enactments of legis-
latures, the common law comprises the body of those principles 
and rules of action, relating the government and security of per-
sons and property, that derive their authority solely from usages 
and customs of immemorial antiquity, or from the judgments and 
i> 
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decrees of courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such us-
ages and customs. The most common source of American com-
mon law is English common law. 
2
 These states are Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa. Kansas, 
Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
and Wyoming. Five states, Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Michi-
gan, and Mississippi, have so-called one-victim laws on the 
books, but also define certain offenses against the unborn child 
as "homicide." 
3
 See Dena M. Marks, Person v. Potential: Judicial Struggles to 
Decide Claims Arising from the Death of an Embryo or Fetus 
and Michigan s Struggle to Settle the Question, 37 Akron L. 
Rev. 41 (2004). See also Amber Dina, Wrongful Death and the 
Legal Status of the Previable Embryo, 19 Regent U. L. Rev. 
251 (2006/2007). (Nebraska and Texas have changed their law 
by statute since 2004). 
4
 See e.g., Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 66 (S.C. Dist. Ct. 1980). 
5
 Id. 
6
 Id. 
"Id. 
"See Gleitmanv. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689; Willis, 362 S.E.2d 63; 
Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983); and Pwcanik v. Cillo, 478 
A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984). 
9
 Darpana M. Sheth, Better Off Unborn? An Analysis of Wrong-
ful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 73 Tenn. L. Rev. 641, n.23 (2006) (arguing that 
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims violate the "Americans 
with Disabilities Act"). 
